

















This paper uses a DSGE model to examine whether including the exchange rate explicitly in the 
central  bank’s  policy  reaction  function can  improve  macroeconomic  performance.  It  is  found  that
including an element of exchange rate smoothing in the policy reaction function is helpful both for 
financially robust advanced economies and for financially vulnerable emerging economies in handling 
risk premium shocks. As long as the weight placed on exchange rate smoothing is relatively small, the 
effects on inflation and output volatility in the event of demand and cost push shocks are minimal. 
Financially vulnerable emerging economies are especially likely to benefit from some exchange rate 
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1.       For many emerging economies that have either adopted inflation targeting (IT) 
monetary policy frameworks, or are considering doing so, the appropriate role of the 
exchange rate in the framework is a sensitive and difficult issue. Particularly for countries 
where the exchange rate has previously played a key role as an anchor for policy, there is a 
reluctance to move to a completely free float. An important issue for such countries, 
therefore, is whether or how to take the exchange rate into account in an IT framework. 
2.       The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the growing literature on adapting IT 
frameworks to the circumstances of emerging economies. The paper uses small, stylized 
models of a financially vulnerable emerging economy and a financially robust advanced 
economy to compare the performance of alternative policy rules in handling demand, cost 
push, and risk premium shocks. The results suggest that, for financially robust advanced 
economies, putting a small weight on exchange rate smoothing is beneficial in handling risk 
premium shocks, with no significant adverse consequences for inflation or output 
performance. For financially vulnerable emerging economies, the benefits of some 
exchange rate smoothing are found to be even more beneficial, largely reflecting the 
perverse effects of exchange rate movements on demand in financially vulnerable 
economies.  
3.       The paper is organized as follows. Section II begins with a review of relevant 
literature on open economy inflation targeting. Section III outlines taxonomy of alternative 
approaches to bringing the exchange rate into the IT framework. Section IV develops small 
models of a financially robust advanced economy and a financially vulnerable emerging 
economy. Section V reports on the simulations of the models using alternative policy rules 
and in response to alternative shocks. Section VI concludes with a discussion of the 
robustness of the results and areas for future research.  
I.   INFLATION TARGETING IN AN OPEN ECONOMY 
4.       Until relatively recently, most research on the conduct of IT in an open economy 
focused mainly on models with standard industrial country open economy characteristics, 
reflecting the fact that much of the research was focused on the industrial countries that 
pioneered inflation targeting.
5 In his review of the literature to that point, Taylor (2001) 
finds little evidence to support including the exchange rate explicitly in the central bank’s 
policy reaction function, and suggests that this may reflect: (i) the fact that exchange rate 
movements are already taken into account indirectly in a standard IT framework; and (ii) 
that the appropriate response to the exchange rate depends on the nature of the underlying 
shock. Nonetheless, Taylor (2000), Mishkin (2000) and, more recently Edwards (2007), all 
                                                 





underscore the need for further research in this area, particularly in relation to emerging 
economies. 
5.       More recent research on inflation targeting policy rules provides mixed evidence on 
whether to include the exchange rate directly in the reaction function. One avenue of 
research has been on whether financial vulnerabilities may justify including the exchange 
rate in the reaction function. Céspedes and others (2000), Morón and Winkelried (2005), 
and Cavoli and Rajan (2006), suggest that there may be some benefit from including the 
exchange rate in the reaction function in financially vulnerable economies, but also find that 
the optimal weight is low. However, Batini and others (2007), using a model of the fairly 
heavily dollarized Peruvian economy, conclude that no weight should be put on the 
exchange rate in a financially vulnerable economy, and argue that because dollarization 
weakens the output gap channel of transmission relative to the exchange rate channel, 
nothing should be done to limit the flexibility of the exchange rate in order to achieve the 
inflation target.  
6.       Other authors consider the implications for IT frameworks in emerging economies 
of other structural features of emerging markets. Ravenna and Natalucci (2008) find that 
significant smoothing of the exchange rate has adverse macroeconomic consequences when 
there are substantial Balassa Samuelson effects resulting from differential productivity 
growth in the tradables and nontradables sectors. McCallum (2006), however, finds that an 
exchange rate based approach to IT may be beneficial in a very open economy such as that 
of Singapore.  
7.       Another avenue of investigation focuses on the implications of uncertainty regarding 
the transmission mechanisms in the economy, and may be particularly relevant to emerging 
economies. Leitemo and Söderstöm (2005) consider the choice of policy rules when there is 
uncertainty about the true model of exchange rate determination, and find that a standard 
reaction function is slightly more robust than one including the exchange rate. 
Wollmershäuser (2006), however, comes to the opposite conclusion after examining a wider 
range of rules and types of exchange rate uncertainty.  
8.       Support for dampening exchange rate movements is also found in the presence of 
incomplete exchange rate pass through (pricing to market),
6 as well as in the event of sector 
specific shocks with imperfect substitutability of consumption across goods.
7     
II.   MODEL CHARACTERISTICS AND CALIBRATION  
9.      In this section, a small open economy Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) model is developed to evaluate the performance of alternative IT approaches in 
                                                 
6 See e.g., Devereux and Engel (2003) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005). 





financially robust advanced economies and financially vulnerable emerging market 
economies. The section begins with a description of the model, followed by a discussion of 
the calibration of two versions of the model; one with the characteristics of an “advanced” 
economy with high policy credibility and well functioning financial markets; the other an 
“emerging market” economy with limited policy credibility, limited domestic financial 
market development, and external financial vulnerability. The section concludes with a brief 
description of the behavior of key variables in response to different kinds of shocks.  
The small open economy model  
 
10.       The model used in this paper to analyze alternative monetary policy rules is a fairly 
conventional small open economy New Keynesian DSGE model. These models embody a 
synthesis of the modeling approach of the real business cycle literature and micro 
foundations for Keynesian concepts.
8 Such models have essentially neoclassical long run 
characteristics—notably including monetary neutrality—but Keynesian short term 
characteristics, providing scope for monetary policy to affect the real economy over the 
short  to medium term. An important feature of the model used here, is that it abstracts from 
the determination of the steady state of the economy, as well as permanent shocks that 
change the steady state. It focuses on the dynamics of the return to the steady state 
following macroeconomic disturbances.  
11.       The model includes several features which are aimed at capturing some 
characteristics of financially vulnerable emerging market economies. These include: 
·  Explicit inclusion of the exchange rate in the central bank policy reaction function 
(Cavoli and Rajan, 2006; Kirsanova, Campbell and Wren Lewis, 2006); 
·  Weak policy credibility and endogenous, history dependent expectations formation 
(Erceg and Levin, 2003; Argov and others, 2007);  
·  An endogenous risk premium (following Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco, 2002), 
increasing in external indebtedness and the exchange rate; 
·  Limited intertemporal arbitrage in consumption (following Amato and Laubach, 
2003; Galí, Lopez Salido, and Vallés, 2004, 2006), to reflect the relatively undeveloped 
domestic financial systems in many emerging markets;  
·  Perverse exchange rate effects on income (following Morón and Winkelried, 2005) 
to reflect adverse balance sheet effects; 
·  Different timing of exchange rate pass through to costs and prices (Monacelli, 
2004); and  
                                                 
8 Good overviews of the synthesis of approaches are found in Goodfriend and King (1995), Clarida, Galí and 





·  An exported natural resource, providing scope for terms of trade shocks. 
12.       The log linearized equations included in the model are as follows: 
Aggregate spending 
 
13.       Optimizing Ricardian consumption is derived from a standard separable utility 
function on consumption  t C  and labor  t N : 
1













            (1)  
where: 
    s  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion; 
g  is the degree of habit formation in consumption. This introduces an element of inertia 
into consumption, and is a fairly standard feature of New Keynesian models. 
14.       The first order conditions of utility maximization provide the Euler equation that 
guides consumption:
9 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1
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t i  is the current nominal interest rate 
  1 ˆt p +  is the inflation rate expected in period t+1 
15.       The other part of real consumer spending,  ˆ
r
t c , is based on current income. The share 
of such consumption, λ, described as “rule of thumb” or non Ricardian consumption, is 
likely to be higher in many emerging market economies than in more advanced economies, 
reflecting the more limited access of some households to borrowing and savings 
                                                 
9 See Appendix I for a derivation of Equation 2. 
10 I.e.,  ˆt c , represents the (log) deviation of the level of the variable  t C  from its steady state or long run     






11 To the extent that this constraint holds, real spending is driven by real wages 
and employment : 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
r
t t t t c w p n = - +                 (3) 
where: 
  ˆt w  is the nominal wage rate per unit of work supplied 
  ˆt p  is the price level 
  ˆt n  is the number of units of work supplied 
16.       In addition to domestic demand, there is also foreign demand for the domestically 
produced good,  ˆ
d
t x . Export demand depends on foreign real income and the real exchange 
rate: 
*
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) d d
d d
t t t t x x x x q y r r t -   = + - +                (4) 
where: 
* ˆt y  is foreign real income 
ˆt q  is the real exchange rate (the real cost of foreign currency) 
d x r  is the degree of persistence in domestically produced exports 
t  is the real exchange rate elasticity of demand for domestically produced exports 
 
17.       Aggregate spending on the domestically produced good, 
d
t y ˆ , is composed of 
domestic spending,  ˆt c , plus exports,  ˆ
d
t x : 
   ˆ ˆ ˆ
d
d d














 represent the respective shares of consumption and exports in domestic output 
in the steady state. 
18.       A fraction, l , of domestic spending is credit constrained or “rule of thumb” (non 
Ricardian) consumption,  ˆ
r
t c , while the rest is inter temporally optimized (Ricardian) 
consumption,  ˆ
o
t c ,: 
                                                 
11 This may reflect limited development of financial systems (lack of suitable product ranges or limited retail 
branch development) or legal weaknesses inhibiting collateralization of borrowing. See, e.g., Galí, Lopez 
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19.       Output in the economy consists of two types of goods. The first is a composite good 
produced by monopolistically competitive firms both for domestic consumption and also for 
export. The second good is a natural endowment commodity which is exported. 
20.       The domestically produced composite good, 
d
t y ˆ , is produced using a CES 
production technology with inputs of labor,  ˆt n ,  and an imported input,  t I . This production 
function is particularly convenient because of its generality, given that it embeds a Cobb 
Douglas or even a Leontief technology, depending on the size of the elasticity of input 
substitution,  s s :  
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) ((1 ) ( ) )
S S S S d
t t t t y n I a
s s s s a a a a = - + + - +         (7) 
where: 
  s s  is the elasticity of substitution in production 
  t I  is the imported intermediate input 
  ˆt n  is the labor input  
  a  is the share of the imported good in production—the openness of the economy 
  ˆt a  is total factor productivity 
21.       Production costs reflect the costs of the labor and the imported inputs, as well as 
labor. The real cost of imported inputs is determined by the real exchange rate,  ˆt q , while the 
real wage,  ˆ ˆ ( ) t t w p - , is determined by the equilibration of producers’ demand for labor,  ˆt n , 
with the supply of labor by households. The supply of labor by fully optimizing consumers 
is derived from maximization of utility in equation (3). Non Ricardian consumers are 
assumed to supply the same amount of labor as Ricardians.
12 Aggregate supply depends 
positively on real wage and negatively on consumption. This is a typical result obtained 
from the first order condition with respect to labor of separable utility functions:
13 
                                                 
12 This assumption follows Galí, López Salido, and Vallés (2007).  





  ( ) ( ) { } 1
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) 1 1 ( 1)
t t t t t n w p c c
v
g s g g -
  = - - - - -     -
        (8) 
where: 
    v is the coefficient of disutility of labor  
22.       With the production technology specified in equation (7), the log deviation of the 
real marginal cost of production,  ˆ
R
r mc , is given by:  
  ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) (1 )
s s s s R
r t t t t mc w p q a
s s s s a a a a   = - - + - - +        (9) 
where: 
  ˆt w  is the nominal wage rate per unit of work supplied 
  ˆt p  is the price level 
ˆt q  is the real exchange rate (the real cost of foreign currency) 
23.       Equation (9) shows that the more open the economy—i.e., the higher the value of 
a —the larger the impact of exchange rate movements on production costs and inflation. 
The elasticity of substitution in production,  s s , also plays an important role: the lower the 
possibility of substituting domestic labor for imported inputs, the larger the impact of an 
exchange rate movement on costs.  
24.       Firms set the price of the domestically produced good in one of two ways. One 
group of firms, accounting for a fractionm  of domestic sales, follows a simple, backward 
looking approach to price setting.
14 In effect, this leads to an element of indexation of prices 
generating persistence in inflation. All other firms take a forward looking optimization 
approach to price setting, but adjust their prices on a random basis, à la Calvo. In any given 
period, it is assumed that only a fraction (1 ) q - of the optimizing firms adjust their prices.  
25.       Taking these considerations into account, the aggregate inflation rate in the economy 
will be summarized by a New Keynesian Phillips curve of the form: 
    1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1 1
R





     
= + +       + + +      
        (10) 
where: 
b  is the subjective rate of time preference 
m  is the proportion of price adjustment based on indexation to past prices 
                                                 











= - , where (1 ) q -  is the average frequency of price adjustment by optimizing 
firms    
ˆ
R
r mc  is the real marginal cost of production
15 
26.       This Phillips curve has three elements. The first is an expected inflation component. 
This reflects the assumption that firms adjust their prices periodically rather than 
continuously, so that when prices are adjusted, firms take into account the expected 
evolution of inflation. The second term is a lagged inflation component reflecting the 
indexation applied to a fraction m  of prices. The third term reflects the incorporation of 
marginal costs into optimizing firms’ prices. Exchange rate movements feed into inflation 
through their impact on marginal costs. The speed of pass through into inflation will depend 
both on the proportion of optimizing firms and on the average frequency of price 
adjustments. 
27.       Production of the second endowment type good,  ˆ
CM
t x , is essentially exogenous, and 
is completely exported. The amount produced of this commodity does not react to its price, 
and the requirement for local inputs to its production is negligible. Its value depends on the 
real exchange rate and its price,
CM
t p , abroad which is given by international markets. 
Consequently, the value of production is determined as: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
CM CM
t t t x q p = +                 (11) 
Exchange rate determination 
 
28.       The real exchange rate is assumed to be determined by the real uncovered interest 
parity condition, the lagged exchange rate, and a risk premium:
16 
( ) ( )
* *
1 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 )
s s
t t t t t t t t q q q i i f f p p f + - + + = - + - - + - +         (12) 
 
where:  
* ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ t t t t q s p p = + -  is the real exchange rate ( ˆt s  is the spot price of foreign exchange, and 
* ˆt p is 
the foreign price level 
s f is the degree of persistence in the real exchange rate 
* ˆ
t i  is the foreign nominal interest rate 
                                                 
15 See Appendix I for the derivation of firms’ marginal cost. 
16 The inclusion of a lagged exchange rate term follows Berg, Karam, and Laxton (2006), who justify adding 






1 ˆt p +  is the expected foreign inflation rate 
ˆ
t f  is the risk premium  
29.       Following Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2002), the risk premium,  ˆ
t f , depends on 
debt, the external current balance, and balance sheet effects of currency movements: 
17  
  ( )
*
0 1 1 2 3 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 ( ) ( )
d CM
d
t t t t t t t d CM d CM
x x
b y x q I q
x x x x
f f f f f +
   
= - - + - + +     + +    




t b +   is projected external debt in period t+1 
ˆt y   is total production, defined in equation (15),  and as in equation (4) exports is: 
* ˆ ˆ ˆ
d
t t t x q y t = +   if  0 d x r =  or 
*
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) d d
d d
t t t t x x x x q y r r t -   = + - +    if  0 1 d x r < <  
30.       The risk premium consists of four elements: 
·  The first term in the equation,  ( )
*
0 1 ˆ ˆ t t b y f + - , says that the risk premium is an 
increasing function of the external debt to total production ratio. This friction in the 
international capital markets is required to ensure stationarity of the external debt to total 
production ratio.
18  
·  The second and third terms,  ( )
*
1 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ( 1) ( ) t t t q y I f t f - - + + , relate the risk premium 
negatively to exports (driven by foreign demand and competitiveness) and positively to 
imports, so that a weakening of the current account raises the risk premium.  
·  The last term,  3 ˆ ( ) t q f , captures the adverse impact of currency depreciation on the 
domestic currency value of external debt—the balance sheet effect. As the debt service 
burden on borrowers rises, the risk premium increases. For a financially vulnerable 
economy, the adverse impact of depreciation through the balance sheet effect must 
outweigh the beneficial effects of depreciation on the current account, so that depreciation 
has a net harmful effect on activity. This imposes restrictions on the values of the 
parameters in the risk premium equation.
19  
                                                 
17 See also Morón and Winkelried (2005). Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003) develop a closely related 
alternative to modeling this risk premium. 
18 See Schmidt Grohé and Uribe (2003). 







31.       Monetary policy is described by the alternative reaction functions presented in 
Section III. 
Monetary policy credibility 
 
32.       The approach to incorporating monetary policy credibility in this paper assumes that 
the central bank is a well behaved inflation targeter, in the sense that it does not change the 
inflation target according to actual inflation outcomes.
20 However, private agents may not 
fully believe this. Instead, they may believe that the central bank adjusts the target, to some 
extent, in response to deviations of inflation outcomes from the perceived target. The 
deviation of the perceived inflation target from the actual target, 
P
t p , is assumed to evolve 
according to:  
                     ( ) 1 1 1 (1 )
P P P
t p t p t t p r p r k p p - - - = + - -         (14) 
 
33.       A highly credible regime is interpreted as one in which the value of r is high, while 
the value of k is low, so that the target is perceived as stable, and only very large deviations 
of actual inflation from target will shift perceptions of the future target. In a regime with 
low credibility, the opposite holds:  p r is low and k is high, so that the perceived inflation 
target moves relatively strongly in response to recent inflation outcomes. Because the 
parameters determining policy credibility are exogenous, the central bank cannot through its 
actions affect the degree of policy credibility. However, it can take its credibility into 
account when setting policy.  
34.       The misperception of the inflation target affects the economy through several 
channels. Following Argov and others (2007), these include effects on consumption (via the 
perceived real rate of interest), inflation (via inflation expectations), and the real exchange 
rate (via the perceived real interest rate). As a consequence, the Euler equation, Phillips 
curve, and real interest parity equations presented earlier are modified, as follows:  
The modified consumption equation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1
1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ [( ) ] 1 1 1
o o o P
t t t t t t c c c i g g p yp g g g s - + +
- = + - - + + + +   (2)'  
The modified inflation equation: 
                                                 
20 This differs from Erceg and Levin (2003), who assume that the inflation target does in fact change over 





( ) 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1 1
P R
t t t t r mc
b m V
p p yp p
bm bm bm
+ -
     
= + + +       + + +      
      (10)'  
And the modified exchange rate equation: 
( ) ( ) ( )
* *
1 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 )
s s P
t t t t t t t t t q q q i i f f p p yp f + - + + = - + + - - - + +      (12)'                         
35.       These equations incorporate lack of credibility whenever y  > 0. The perception bias 
passes fully to inflation expectations in the exchange rate equation, but only partially feeds 
into the consumption equation and inflation equations. Consequently, in this framework the 
foreign exchange market is more sensitive to lack of credibility than is inflation itself. 
Equilibrium conditions and identities 
 
36.       Total output of the economy is the sum of the domestic consumption and exports of 
the domestically produced good, together with the exports of the exported endowment 
commodity:  
    ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
d CM
d CM
t t t t
c x x
y c x x
y y y










 are shares of consumption, exports of domestically produced good, and 
exports of the endowment commodity, in total production. 
 
Note that GDP is equal to total output minus imports: 
 
  ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )
d
t t y t t
y
GDP y I q
y
a = - +               (16) 
37.       The balance of payments or economy wide constraint is built adding up the 
consumer, government, and firm resource constraints: 
*
* * *
1 1 1 *
*
*
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )




t t y t t
t t t t t t
t
c y
c y I q
y y
b










+ + - - - + -
+
-
      (17)   
38.       The net change in foreign debt should be equal to the current account, which is 





Calibration of “advanced” and “emerging economy” models 
 
39.       Two versions of the model are calibrated. The first is a stylized representation of a 
financially robust “advanced,” economy where there is full credibility of the central bank’s 
commitment to the inflation target. The second economy is a financially vulnerable 
“emerging” economy, where the commitment to the inflation target has only limited 
credibility. These features are reflected in the calibration of the models as follows:
21  
·  Domestic financial system development: In the emerging economy, it is assumed 
that households have more limited access to borrowing and savings opportunities than in an 
advanced economy. As a result, spending will be more closely linked to current income and 
less sensitive to interest rates. To capture these effects, it is assumed that in the emerging 
economy only 70 percent of consumption is based on intertemporal optimization, while 30 
percent is based on current income. In the advanced economy, it is assumed that all 
consumption is based on optimization. 
·  Balance sheet vulnerability: In many emerging economies, a significant part of 
corporate and household financial liabilities are denominated in foreign currency, creating a 
direct exposure of balance sheets to exchange rate movements. To capture this vulnerability, 
it is assumed that the currency risk premium in the emerging economy is positively related 
to the exchange rate.
22 As a result, depreciation of the home currency worsens balance sheet 
positions, leading to an increase in the risk premium.  
·  External financial constraints: The emerging economy is also assumed to face more 
constrained access to international capital markets than does the advanced economy. As a 
consequence, the emerging economy’s country risk premium is assumed to be much more 
sensitive to the external debt/GDP ratio and the trade balance than in the advanced 
economy.  
·  Policy credibility. In the advanced economy, the central bank’s commitment to the 
inflation target is treated as fully credible. In the emerging economy, however, policy is less 
than fully credible. As a result, in the emerging economy, deviations of inflation from target 
have a larger and more persistent impact on inflation expectations, price setting, 
consumption, and the real exchange rate.  
 
 
                                                 
21 The calibration of the model is described in more detail in Appendix II. 
22 This approach to modeling external financial vulnerability follows Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000); 





III.   A TAXONOMY OF HYBRID INFLATION TARGETING APPROACHES  
40.       This section outlines a taxonomy of approaches bringing the exchange rate into the 
IT framework. These comprise: (i) the standard open economy IT framework—“plain 
vanilla” IT—in which exchange rate movements are taken into account only indirectly; (ii) 
an open economy approach which includes the exchange rate explicitly in the central bank’s 
policy reaction function; (iii) IT with an explicit exchange rate band; and (iv) IT with the 
exchange rate rather than a short term interest rate as the policy instrument or operating 
objective. 
41.       These approaches have three important features in common. The first is that 
stabilizing inflation around the target rate is the over riding policy objective over the long 
term.
23 Second, the central bank may also seek to reduce the volatility of output, interest 
rates, and the exchange rate, but it must do so in a way that is consistent with the medium 
term inflation target.
24 Third, the different rules involve a systematic approach to policy, in 
the sense that the elements in the central bank’s policy reaction function and the weights 
placed on the different elements are stable over time.  
“Plain vanilla” inflation targeting in an open economy 
 
42.       The “plain vanilla” approach describes the orthodox IT framework practiced in 
advanced countries.
25 Monetary policy formulation involves periodic adjustments in a target 
policy interest rate, guided primarily by deviations of projected inflation from the target 
and, to a lesser extent, by the deviation of actual GDP from the sustainable rate (the “output 
gap”). Typically, the central bank also seeks to smooth the path of interest rates. This 
approach to policy formulation is captured by the policy reaction function: 
[ ] 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) t i t i t t t i i y v r r dp j - = + - + +      (18a)   
Where:     
                                                 
23 Essentially this requires that the policy instrument reacts strongly enough to a gap between the inflation 
forecast and the target to ensure that inflation will return to the target rate over the long term.  
24 In this context, it is important to distinguish clearly between targets and objectives. The central bank has an 
inflation target, but it has no target for either output or the exchange rate (either in level or rate of change). 
This is distinct from the objective of minimizing variations of inflation around the target, and of output, 
interest rates, and the exchange rate around their steady state values. The output and exchange rate objectives, 
however, need to be cast in terms of deviations from exogenous steady state values to be consistent with the 
inflation target. 
25 See e.g., Mishkin (2000) and Truman (2003) for overviews of the framework, and Svensson (2000) for a 








t t i i r p º - +  is the deviation of policy target interest rate  t i  in period t, from its long run 
steady state value, defined as the long run equilibrium real interest rate r , plus the target 
inflation rate
T p ; 
( ) ˆ
f T
t t p p p º - is the deviation of the period t inflation forecast, 
f
t p , from the inflation 
target
T p ; 
ˆ ( ) t t t y y y º - is the deviation of real output  t y from  t y , the estimated level of potential 
output, in period t; 
t v  represents additional policy judgment as well as imprecision in policy implementation. 
 
43.       Key features of the plain vanilla reaction function are: 
·  The exchange rate does not appear explicitly in the policy reaction function. 
However, exchange rate developments and prospects are taken into account implicitly 
because they affect the inflation forecasts and output.
26  
·  To ensure that the central bank’s actions are consistent with achieving the inflation 
target, the value of d  should be greater than 1, so that the real interest rate changes by at 
least as much as any change in deviation of projected inflation from target.
 27
  
·  Although the central bank does not have a long run target for the level of output or 
growth, it places some weight on dampening output volatility around the sustainable, 
noninflationary level of output (“potential” output), to ensure long run consistency with the 
primary inflation objective.
28 
·  The parameter i r characterizes the degree of policy inertia. If i r is high, the central 
bank will normally adjust the policy stance only gradually in response to economic 
developments or prospects. 
Open-economy inflation targeting 
 
44.       “Open economy” IT involves taking exchange rate developments explicitly into 
account in the central bank’s policy reaction function, rather than just indirectly though the 
effects on output and the inflation forecast. In practice, many IT countries—both advanced 
and emerging economies—appear to adjust interest rates systematically in response to 
                                                 
26 See e.g., Brook (2002), Ragan (2005), and Taylor (2001). 
27 The distinction between “strict” and “flexible” IT discussed in Svensson (2000) partly hinges on 
whetherd is much greater thanj  or not. 
28 Caution is needed in interpreting the weights in the reaction function. These do not necessarily reflect the 
central bank’s preferences regarding stable inflation versus other objectives. For example, even if the central 
bank had no interest in stabilizing output per se, it might still put some weight on dampening output volatility 





exchange rate movements, consistent with an open economy IT approach.
29 The way in 
which the exchange rate enters the reaction function is essentially similar to the way that 
output is included: there is no target for the exchange rate, but some weight is placed on 
dampening exchange rate volatility:
30  
( ) 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) t i t i t t t t t i i y q q v r r dp j c h - - = + - + + - +        (18b) 
Where  ˆt q is the deviation of the real exchange rate in period t from its steady state 
equilibrium value. 
 
45.       This specification allows for dampening volatility in the level of the exchange rate 
relative to the long run equilibrium value, changes in the exchange rate, or both: 
·  If h= 0, the central bank systematically dampens deviations of the level of the 
real exchange rate from the steady state equilibrium rate. 
31 Alternatively, if h= 1, the 
central bank dampens changes in the real exchange rate, consistent with limiting exchange 
rate volatility. 
·  More generally, if 0 < h < 1, the central bank places some weight on dampening 
rapid changes in the exchange rate as well as on limiting exchange rate misalignment. 
46.       Including the exchange rate in the reaction function does not imply setting a 
exchange rate target. Indeed, it is essential that dampening exchange rate volatility be 
conducted in a manner that is consistent with the noninflationary long term equilibrium of 
the economy. This is particularly important if the policy responds to deviations of the level 
of the exchange rate from the estimated steady state value, since errors in estimating the 
long term equilibrium level may lead to systematic bias in the stance of policy, and a 
conflict between the inflation and exchange rate objectives.
32  
                                                 
29 See e.g., Mohanty and Klau (2004), Frommel and Schobert (2006), Leiderman and others (2006), Wei 
(2008), and Aizenman and Hutchison (2008). 
30 See e.g., Ball (2000), Batini and others (2001), and Taylor (2001). 
31 Note that the steady state value of the real exchange rate may have an upward or downward trend over time, 
particularly in emerging market economies experiencing significant structural change. 
32 Of course, this applies equally to dampening fluctuations in the level of output relative to the estimated level 





Inflation targeting with an exchange rate band 
 
47.       IT with an exchange rate band involves setting limits on the acceptable range of 
movement of the exchange rate. In the case of a symmetric exchange rate band, the policy 
reaction function can be represented as:
33 
( ) 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) t i t i t t t t t i i y q q v r r dp j c y h - - = + - + + + - +        (18c) 
Where: 
y = 0 if  ˆt q q¢ <    
  y >> 0 if  ˆt q q¢ ³  
  q¢ is half the width of the exchange rate band.   
48.       Within the band, the approach will work essentially as the open economy IT 
approach, but once the edge of the band is reached the inflation objective will be over 
ridden by the exchange rate objective.
34 Clearly, if the exchange rate band is wide relative to 
the typical magnitude of exchange rate changes, then the band will rarely be binding, and 
the approach will be similar to open economy IT. If the band is relatively narrow, however, 
the regime may appear similar to an exchange rate peg (a crawling peg if the equilibrium 
exchange rate is moving over time or some kind of peg to a composite if the real effective 
exchange rate is used). The nonlinearity of the response of policy to exchange rate 
movements that is implied by this framework is difficult to incorporate in a simple model, 
and for this reason is not included in the model simulations. 
Exchange rate-based inflation targeting 
 
49.       The exchange rate rather than an interest rate can be used as the operating 
instrument or proximate target for monetary policy.
35 In this case, the central bank’s policy 
reaction function can be described as: 
[ ] 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) t q t q t t t q q y v r r dp j - = + - + +      (18e) 
 
 
                                                 
33 See Morón and Winkelried (2005). 
34 As long as the deviation of the real exchange rate from the steady state equilibrium,  ˆt q , is less than some 
amount q¢, then policy will be based on an open economy IT approach (or plain vanilla if the exchange rate 
coefficientc  is set to zero). However, if the exchange rate reaches the q¢threshold, then the interest rate 
response to further exchange rate deviation,( ) c y + , will be much stronger, over riding the inflation 
objective. 
 





50.       Key features of this approach are: 
·  As in the plain vanilla and open economy approaches, the coefficient on the 
inflation objective, d , must be high enough to ensure that inflation will be brought back to 
target over the medium term; and 
·  In principle, this approach could be implemented directly through unsterilized 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. Alternatively, the central bank could use a very 
short term domestic interest rate to move the exchange rate to the desired level.
36  
IV.   EVALUATION OF HYBRID INFLATION TARGETING RULES 
51.       In this section, the performance of alternative hybrid IT policy rules in handling 
domestic demand, cost push, and risk premium shocks is evaluated using the calibrated 
models of the financially robust advanced economy and financially vulnerable emerging 
economy. The analysis focuses on three issues:  
·  Whether hybrid policy rules can outperform plain vanilla IT; 
·  How much weight, if any, to place on the exchange rate in the policy rule; and  
·  How hybrid policy rules affect the variability of a wider range of macroeconomic 
and financial variables. 
Hybrid policy rules and the inflation-output volatility trade-off  
 
52.       Figure 1 shows policy tradeoffs for plain vanilla IT in robust advanced and 
vulnerable emerging economies when exposed to demand, cost push, and risk premium 
shocks. The curves, or frontiers, show the combinations of minimum inflation and output 
variability achievable by varying the weights on inflation and output in the plain vanilla IT 
policy  
rule.
37 The derivation of the policy trade off frontiers is explained in Appendix III.  
                                                 
36 In the latter case, the exchange rate can be described as a proximate or operational target, intermediate 
between the operating instrument and the inflation objective. 
37 Appendix III explains in detail the derivation of the policy trade off frontiers, and also discusses impulse 






Figure 1. Plain Vanilla Inflation Targeting in the Robust Advanced Economy and the 
Vulnerable Emerging Economy 
Demand shocks




































































































   Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
53.       The charts show that: 
·  The volatility of output and/or inflation is typically significantly higher in the 
vulnerable emerging market economy than in the robust advanced economy, for comparably 
sized shocks of all kinds, reflecting differences in economic structure.
38 
·  In both economies the scope for a trade off between inflation and output variability 
depends greatly, and broadly similarly, on the nature of the economic disturbances: 
·  In the case of demand disturbances, the “V” shaped frontiers indicate that 
there is very little scope for a trade off between inflation and output variability following a 
plain vanilla policy rule. For both economies, more forceful policy responses to either 
inflation or the output gap or both, reduce the volatility of both inflation and output. 
·  In contrast, with cost push disturbances, the inflation and output objectives 
conflict. As a result, there is a clear trade off between output and inflation variability, which 
is reflected in the downward sloping frontiers. 
·  With risk premium disturbances, as with demand disturbances, there is 
essentially no trade off between minimizing inflation volatility and output volatility with 
the plain vanilla policy rule. 
54.       Figure 2 compares the performances of alternative policy reaction functions in the 
robust advanced and vulnerable emerging economies. These include: (i) the plain vanilla 
                                                 
38 In particular, the ability of the central bank in the emerging economy to achieve low inflation and output 
volatility is hindered by the weakness of the interest rate channel of transmission, the perverse exchange rate 





rule; (ii) the open economy policy rule with a weight of 0.25 on the change in the exchange 
rate; (iii) the open economy rule with a weight of 0.25 on a “½ and ½” mix of the change 
and level of the exchange rate;
39 and (iv) the exchange rate based rule, with a weight of 0.7 
placed on smoothing the exchange rate. 
55.       With regard to demand shocks, it is still the case that there is little scope for a trade 
off between output and inflation volatility. However, different policy rules have significant 
effects on the position of the policy frontier. In the case of the advanced economy, the plain 
vanilla rule, and the two open economy rules perform very similarly, reflecting the low 
weight placed on the exchange rate in the calibration of the rule. However, the exchange 
rate based rule performs poorly because it significantly dampens appropriate movements in 
both the exchange rate and the interest rate. 
56.       In the emerging economy, in contrast, the hybrid rules and especially the exchange 
rate based rule lead to lower output volatility, with no greater inflation volatility than under 
the plain vanilla rule. This result reflects that fact that in the vulnerable economy, the 
domestic demand shock leads to currency depreciation rather than appreciation, with 
counterproductive effects on inflation and output volatility.
40 In these circumstances, 
resisting depreciation is helpful, both because it minimizes exchange rate pass through to 
inflation and because it leads to a stronger interest rate response than would otherwise 
occur. 
57.       An important point to note in this context is that the source of the demand shock 
matters for the emerging economy because of the sensitivity of the exchange rate to the 
trade balance. With the domestic demand shock, the deterioration in the trade balance 
induces unhelpful depreciation of the currency.
41 However, if the demand shock were 
external in origin, a stronger trade balance would induce helpful currency appreciation. In 
this case, as in the advanced economy, exchange rate smoothing may be unhelpful. 
58.       In the event of cost push disturbances, all of the rules perform very similarly in both 
types of economy. Adding an element of exchange rate smoothing does not significantly 
alter the basic conflict that is generated between offsetting the inflation and output effects of 
such shocks. In both economies, a cost push shock tends to induce real appreciation of the 
currency. Resisting this appreciation by cutting interest rates would tend to counter the fall 
in output, but at the cost of higher inflation. As a consequence, the hybrid rules will tend to 
shift the policy frontier in the direction of lower output volatility and higher inflation 
volatility, but, as shown in Figure 2, no closer to the origin. 
 
                                                 
39 i.e., h = 0.5 in equation 18b. 
40 See the discussion of impulse responses in Appendix III. 





Figure 2. Alternative Hybrid Policy Rules and the Variability of Inflation and Output in 
Advanced and Emerging Market Economies
1/  
  Financially Robust Advanced Economy
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1/ Frontiers are derived by varying the weights on inflation and output gaps in the policy reaction function, while holding the coefficient on 
the exchange rate objective at 0.25 in the open-economy rules, and the coefficient on instrument smoothing at 0.7.  





59.       With risk premium shocks, the hybrid policy rules tend to outperform the plain 
vanilla, with the “½ and ½” version of the open economy rule performing particularly well. 
A risk premium shock leads to a significant currency depreciation in both types of 
economy, boosting both inflation and output (through increased external competitiveness). 
Resisting the depreciation tends to reduce the volatility of both inflation and output. An 
important caveat in this regard, however, is that even though the risk premium shock raises 
output, consumption falls in both types of economy. Resisting the depreciation of the 
currency will tend to accentuate the decline in consumption, with the result that a trade off 
may arise between dampening inflation and stabilizing domestic demand.  
60.       These results are generally consistent with conventional views on appropriate policy 
responses to different kinds of shocks. Ragan (2005) observes that, in an advanced 
economy, exchange rate movements associated with disturbances directly affecting demand 
tend to offset the output and inflation effects of the shock. Consequently, rules that dampen 
exchange rate adjustment to demand disturbances will tend to be counter productive. If the 
exchange rate movement is unhelpful, as in may be the case for a domestic demand shock in 
a vulnerable emerging market, rules resisting the exchange rate movement may be 
beneficial. 
61.       In the case of risk premium shocks, the exchange rate movements are destabilizing, 
so that the hybrid rule including some dampening of exchange rate changes outperforms the 
plain vanilla approach. This is consistent with Ragan’s argument that, in the case of risk 
premium shocks, an IT oriented monetary policy should aim to offset the induced demand 
effects of the shock in order to dampen the inflation consequences. This can be achieved by 
allowing the interest rate to rise just enough to offset the demand stimulus of a weaker 
currency.
42 The hybrid rule works in this direction and thus outperforms the plain vanilla 
approach. 
62.       The simulation results suggest that for advanced economies, open economy hybrid 
policy rules with a low weight on the exchange rate, perform very similarly to the plain 
vanilla rule in handling demand and cost push shocks, and significantly better in handling 
risk premium shocks. The exchange rate based policy rule, however, generally performs 
quite poorly. An exception, as McCallum (2006) observes, may be in an economy that is 
extremely open. In the emerging economy, the plain vanilla policy rule is generally 
outperformed by hybrid policy rules. The exchange rate based approach works well in the 
event of domestic demand shocks, but not others. The open economy rules perform 
similarly for demand and cost push shocks, but the “½ and ½” version works best in the 
event of risk premium shocks. The reason for this is that this version of the rule induces 
                                                 
42 This is precisely the logic underlying the design and use of a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), which was 
to offset the impact of exogenous exchange rate shocks on aggregate demand, with the relative weights in the 





more persistence in the response to the exchange rate movement than the other version, and 
that this appears to be appropriate in the face of persistent shocks.
43 
63.       The choice of policy rule should reflect the predominant kinds of shocks to which 
the economy is exposed, as well as the structure of the economy. In reality, monetary 
policymakers are faced with an array of different kinds of shocks, of different magnitudes, 
often simultaneously. Moreover, there is often substantial uncertainty surrounding the 
nature of the shocks. In such circumstances, it makes sense for the central bank to have a 
‘default’ rule that is likely to perform reasonably well in response to the kinds of 
disturbances to which the economy is typically exposed. The analysis in this section 
suggests that the plain vanilla rule, which performs well in advanced economies primarily 
affected by demand shocks, may not perform so well as a default rule in many emerging 
markets.  
How much weight to put on the exchange rate in a hybrid policy rule? 
 
64.       Even if it may be beneficial in some circumstances to include the exchange rate in 
the policy reaction function, a key issue is whether the weight placed on the exchange rate 
should be large or small. The following simulations focus on how the variability of inflation 
and output is affected by changing the weight on the exchange rate, while holding fixed the 
weights placed on the inflation and output objectives. Two cases are considered: In the first, 
the policy reaction function places high weights on inflation and output.
44 In the second 
case, the weights are close to those used in the classic Taylor rule.
45 The Taylor rule 
provides a standard benchmark for evaluating modifications to policy rules. An additional 
consideration is that, as noted in Appendix V, the inflation and output volatility associated 
with the forceful plain vanilla rule and the Taylor rules are relatively similar in the 
advanced economy, but quite dissimilar in the vulnerable emerging economy. 
65.       Figure 3 shows how the variability of inflation and output shifts as the weight on the 
exchange rate is increased in policy rules with either forceful or Taylor responses to 
inflation and output. The starting point for each curve is the plain vanilla result, with a 
weight of zero on the exchange rate. For the advanced economy, the hybrid rule considered 
is the “½ and ½” open economy rule, which appeared to deliver the best results for hybrid 
rules in the first set of simulations. For the emerging economy, the “½ and ½” open 
economy rule is shown, as well as the exchange rate based IT rule. 
                                                 
43 Wollmershäuser (2006) also finds that a mixed rule outperforms alternatives, even with forward looking 
expectations. The better performance of this type of rule he attributes to the fact that the both the current and 
previous values of the exchange rate contain useful forward looking information that is not being captured in 
the central bank’s incorrect model of the economy. 
44 The weights on inflation and output are 2.4 and 1.6, respectively. Based on the evidence in the literature, 






Figure 3. The Impact of Exchange Rate Smoothing on the Variability of Inflation and Output 
in Robust Advanced and Vulnerable Emerging Economies
1/  
  Forceful Responses to Inflation and Output










































































































































































































                                                                                                                                                     
45 The Taylor rule uses weights of 1.5 and 0.5 on inflation and output, respectively. In the simulations, the 





1/ Frontiers are derived by varying the coefficient on the exchange rate between zero (plain vanilla IT) and 2.25, while holding the weights 
on the inflation and output objectives unchanged.  
2/ The forceful response puts weights of 2.4 and 1.6 on inflation and output, respectively. The Taylor response puts weights of 1.5 and 
0.55 on inflation and output, respectively.  
   Source: Authors’ calculations. 
66.       The curves in the panels trace out how the inflation/output volatility trade off shifts 
as the weight put on the exchange rate in the policy rule increases. In other words, they 
show whether the trade off curves in Figure 2 move closer to the origin or further away as 
the exchange rate smoothing objective increases in importance. In the first panel of Figure 
3, for example, the curve for the advanced economy shows that as the weight on the 
exchange rate is increased from zero (i.e., a plain vanilla rule), the volatility of output and 
inflation rises. In the case of the emerging market, increasing the weight on the exchange 
rate from zero first leads to a decline in output volatility but that increasing the weight 
beyond about 0.75 mainly serves to increase the volatility of inflation. For exchange rate 
based IT in the emerging economy, increasing the degree of exchange rate smoothing raises 
the volatility of output; and beyond a weight of about 0.75, raises the volatility of both 
inflation and output. 
67.       Overall, the results suggest that, even when it is beneficial to include the exchange 
rate in the reaction function, the weight placed on it should be quite small:  
·  For the advanced, financially robust economy, forceful plain vanilla policy rules 
perform best in response to demand and cost push shocks. Including the exchange rate in 
the policy rule is beneficial for risk premium shocks, but only up to a point—increasing the 
weight beyond about 1.0 increases volatility of both inflation and output. The results are 
essentially similar in the policy rule with Taylor responses to inflation and output, although 
the simulations suggest that placing a small weight (i.e., about 0.25) on the exchange rate 
also slightly reduces inflation volatility in response to demand shocks. 
·  For the emerging, financially vulnerable economy, the simulations suggest putting a 
somewhat higher weight on the exchange rate. With both domestic demand and risk 
premium shocks, the results suggest that a significant reduction in output volatility can be 
achieved, with little impact on inflation volatility, by placing a weight of around 0.5 on the 
exchange rate in the “½ and ½” open economy rule. However, placing any weight on the 
exchange rate worsens inflation performance in the event of supply shocks. 
·  In the emerging economy, placing some weight on the exchange rate in a “½ and ½” 
open economy rule with Taylor responses to inflation and output is especially beneficial. 
Placing some weight on the exchange rate substantially reduces the volatility of output with 
all types of shocks, and also reduces inflation volatility in the event of demand and risk 
premium shocks. Even so, the volatility of inflation and output is still substantially higher 
than with more forceful responses, so a stronger weight on the exchange rate is not a very 





How hybrid policy rules affect a wider range of macroeconomic variables? 
 
68.       Although stable inflation and growth may be the principal concerns of IT central 
banks, they also typically seek to avoid inducing high variability in interest rates, the 
exchange rate, and international trade performance. The third set of simulations, therefore, 
focuses on the impact of alternative hybrid frameworks on the volatility of a wider range of 
variables than just output and inflation. In these simulations, the weights placed on the 
inflation, output, and exchange rate objectives are in line with the evidence from the earlier 
simulations of the combination of weights that would minimize output and inflation 
volatility.
46  
69.       The “cobweb” graphs in Figure 4 plot the variability of output and inflation, real 
interest rates, the real exchange rate, and the real trade balance associated with domestic 
demand, cost push, and risk premium shocks, in advanced and emerging market economies, 
under alternative IT rules.
47 The graphs indicate that: 
·  In general, the volatility of the five variables tends to be greatest in response to cost 
push shocks. In the advanced economy, overall volatility in response to demand and risk 
premium shocks is similar, while in the emerging economy volatility is less in response to 
risk premium shocks than to demand shocks; 
·  In both types of economy, and for almost all policy rules, the volatility of inflation 
tends to be higher than for output, and the volatility of the real exchange rate tends to be 
much higher than for all other variables; 
·  In the advanced economy, the Taylor rule performs very well in dampening 
inflation, output and interest rate volatility, but poorly in terms of exchange rate and current 
account volatility. In the emerging market, however, the Taylor rule performs very poorly 
compared with alternative rules. Essentially this reflects the fact that in the  emerging 







                                                 
46 See e.g., Taylor (1993), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998 and 2000), and Parrado (2004).  
47 See also Appendix III Tables 3a c with the data underlying the cobweb graphs. The tables also report results 






Figure 4. Performance of Alternative Policy Rules on Macroeconomic and Financial Volatility 
in Advanced and Emerging Economies
1/ 
  Financially Robust Advanced Economy































































































1/ The plain vanilla, open economy (1/2&1/2), and exchange rate-based rules use weights of 2.4 and 1.6 on inflation and 
output, respectively. Taylor rule uses weights of 1.5 and 0.55 on inflation and output, respectively. The open economy 
(1/2&1/2) rule uses a weight of 0.25 on the exchange rate term, while the exchange rate-based rule uses a weight of 0.7 on 
the lagged exchange rate. 







70.       Table 1, summarizes roughly how the different rules compare in terms of the 
volatility of inflation and output on the one hand, versus interest rate and exchange rate 
volatility on the other. The volatilities shown in the table are calculated as the simple 
average of the standard deviations of the relevant variables, averaged over the three kinds of 
shocks. The table suggests that for both types of economy, the open economy rule using 
either the exchange rate change alone, or a ½ and ½ average of the change and level of the 
exchange rate could significantly reduce financial volatility compared with a plain vanilla 
rule, at little if any, cost in terms of output and inflation volatility.  
71.       Although this result is somewhat sensitive to priority accorded to minimizing the 
variability of inflation as opposed to output, and to the probabilities and appropriate 
weighting of different kinds of shocks, the more general point is that having a modest 
element of exchange rate smoothing in the reaction function may not be very harmful to the 
primary policy objectives, but may be helpful in reducing volatility in financial markets, 
especially in financially vulnerable emerging market economies. 
Table 1. Macroeconomic and Financial Volatility Associated with Alternative Policy Rules 
 
  Advanced economy  Emerging economy 












Interest rate and exchange 
rate volatility
1/ 
Taylor rule  1.23  2.90  3.74  7.74 
Plain vanilla  0.96  2.65  1.51  2.87 
Open economy 
(1/2&1/2) 
0.95  2.15  1.53  2.48 
Open economy 
(XR change) 
0.95  2.42  1.46  2.66 
Open economy 
(XR level) 
1.11  2.34  1.74  2.41 
XR based IT  1.14  1.67  1.80  2.18 
1/ Average of standard deviations of variables averaged across demand, cost push and risk premium shocks 
   Source: Authors’ calculations. 
General assessment 
 
72.       The simulation results suggest that financially robust advanced economies have 
little to lose and potentially some to gain by including the exchange rate directly in the 
policy reaction function. Consistent with the conventional wisdom, including the exchange 
rate in the reaction function does little to alter inflation and output performance in the event 
of demand or cost push shocks. However, if the economy is vulnerable to risk premium 





73.       The results also suggest that financially vulnerable emerging market economies 
might benefit from a hybrid IT approach. In such countries, the analysis suggests that a 
hybrid approach may lead to slightly better output and inflation performance than with a 
plain vanilla approach. Where the hybrid approach appears to offer more substantial 
benefits is in reducing volatility in the exchange rate, interest rate, and trade balance, 
particularly in the event of risk premium disturbances. Since these countries may be much 
more exposed to such disturbances than financially robust advanced economies, this is an 
important advantage.  
74.       At the same time, the analysis also finds that the weight put on the exchange rate in 
a hybrid framework should be small relative to the weights on inflation and output. The 
simulations indicate that putting more than a modest weight on dampening exchange rate 
volatility is likely to significantly worsen macroeconomic performance.
48 
75.       With regard to an exchange rate based approach to inflation targeting, the analysis  
suggests that this may work well in lowering volatility of the exchange rate, interest rate, 
and trade balance, but that this may come at a high price in terms of inflation and output 
volatility if the economy is particularly exposed to demand and cost push shocks. As with 
other hybrid rules, a high degree of exchange rate smoothing in the rule is likely to harm 
macroeconomic performance. In addition, such a framework may be problematic from an 
operational perspective. In particular, the framework could be prone to speculative 
pressures in advance of periodic resets of the exchange rate, resulting in high interest rate 
volatility, pressure on foreign exchange reserves, or both.  
76.       For emerging market economies that are in a relatively robust financial position, a 
hybrid IT framework is likely to be less beneficial than in more vulnerable economies. 
Dollarization is fairly low in many emerging market economies, so that the net impact on 
demand of exchange rate changes is in the same direction as in an advanced economy.
49 In 
these circumstances, the case for a hybrid IT approach will tend to be weaker than in a more 
financially vulnerable economy. However, such economies may still be more exposed than 
most advanced economies to risk premium shocks and this is the type of shock where a 
hybrid approach outperforms plain vanilla IT in both kinds of economy.  
                                                 
48 In the model used in this paper, macroeconomic performance tends to deteriorate significantly if the weight 
put on exchange rate smoothing is more than about 0.5. This is consistent with the results in Ravenna and 
Natalucci (2008), who find that putting a large weight on exchange rate smoothing is disadvantageous in 
handling sectoral productivity shocks. It may be noted that in their model, the “flexible” exchange rate rule 
uses a weight on the exchange rate of 0.1, relative to weights of 0.4 on output and 1.0 on inflation.  
49 See e.g., Tovar (2006) who finds that for the Korean economy, the stimulative effects of devaluation 







77.       As with any other small model, the one used in this analysis has important 
limitations. These constrain the kinds of questions or issues that can be addressed, and also 
mean that caution is warranted in drawing strong conclusions on the generality of the 
results. Indeed, the analysis itself points to the need for caution, as the effects of different 
types of shocks and the implications of differences in economic structure or policy rules can 
be substantial. Some important issues that are not addressed within the model include: 
·  The long run equilibrium, or “steady state,” of the economy: In the model used in 
the analysis, the steady state of the economy is exogenous. Consequently, the model cannot 
readily compare the performance of alternative policy frameworks in handling changes in 
the steady state of the economy, nor possible effects of different policy approaches on the 
steady state. A particular example concerns possible hysteresis effects of real exchange rate 
movements on potential output, implying that temporary shocks can have permanent 
effects. It is not clear, however, whether such limitations of the model would, on balance, 
strengthen the case for whether and how to include the exchange rate in the monetary policy 
reaction function. 
·  Uncertainty regarding the steady state: Because the model is specified in terms of 
deviations of variables from steady state values, it implicitly assumes that the steady state 
values are known. Errors in estimating steady state values will result in policy mistakes and 
greater macroeconomic volatility, than if the steady state values were known. However, it is 
not obvious that this is an argument for excluding the exchange rate from the reaction 
function. There has been extensive analysis of an analogous issue—the implications of mis 
estimating potential output. In general, however, research on this issue indicates that even if 
potential output is mis estimated, it is still better to include the output gap in the policy 
reaction function.
50 An additional consideration is whether errors in the estimates of the 
steady state values of the real interest rate, real exchange rate, and output gap are likely to 
be correlated with one another. In principle, at least, inclusion of the exchange rate in the 
reaction function might improve policy, if errors in measuring the steady state typically 
offset errors in measuring steady state values of the other variables.  
·  Uncertainty regarding the correct model of the economy: Although there is always 
uncertainty about the correct model of the economy, the problem may be more acute in 
emerging markets undergoing extensive structural change, and where data availability and 
quality may be weaker than in more advanced economies. In this case, it is desirable to have 
policy rules that are robust to model error. In this regard, Wollmershäuser (2006) finds that 
                                                 





an open economy IT rule is more robust than a plain vanilla rule to a range of errors in 
specifying the correct model of the exchange rate.
51  
·  Linearity of the model: This is a standard property of most models, but has some 
important implications for this analysis. In particular, it means that the model cannot take 
into account threshold effects or asymmetries that may be important in the transmission of 
financial disturbances or exchange rate movements. It also limits the ability to deal with the 
implications of uncertainty for the design and choice of policy framework. In particular, the 
model is not really able to address the consequences for different policy rules of 
uncertainties regarding different shocks or the steady state of the economy. 
·  Model parameters: The model parameters are imposed rather than estimated. 
Although most parameters are drawn from the relevant literature, the two country models 
are deliberately intended to highlight differences. Thus, the emerging market model is 
calibrated to ensure financial vulnerability. In view of this, the findings of the analysis 
should not be seen as prescriptions for policy in any particular country. To translate the 
analysis into policy, the kinds of policy rules examined in this analysis would need to be 
adapted to models estimated or calibrated to reflect the structure of specific economies. 
                                                 
51 Moreover, the rule which performs best is a mixed rule putting some weight on both the level and change in 
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APPENDIX I. OPTIMIZATION IN THE MODEL 
Consumer problem 
 
Households maximize utility from consumption and leisure: 
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subject to a budget constraint: 
 
* *
* 1 1 1 1
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Ct  is real consumption in period t  
Nt  is labor supply 
Wt  is the nominal wage rate 
Pt  is the domestic price level 
Dt is dividend income 
*
t B  is foreign debt 
f  is the risk premium 
*
t i  is the foreign interest rate 
Qt is the real exchange rate 
*
t P  is the price of imports 
t B  is domestic assets 
t i  is the domestic interest rate 
T is net transfer income.  
That is, nominal Consumption is equal to wage income, WN, plus dividends, D, plus 
























transfers (or taxes if it is negative) from the government, T . Foreign debt is assumed to be 





multiplying by the nominal exchange rate S. In addition, instead of  expressing debt growth 
or assets growth as 
* * *
1 (1 ) t t t t t S B i S B f + = + we divide both sides by 
* (1 ) t i f + .
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First order conditions of the optimization are: 
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Marginal cost in the case of a CES production function 
Domestic output, 
d
t Y , is given by a standard CES production function:  
1 1
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t A  is total factor productivity 
a  is the share of the imported good in production—the openness of the economy  
t I  is the imported intermediate input  
s s  is the elasticity of substitution in production 
  t N  is the labor input  
The firm’s problem is to choose inputs N and I to minimize its costs 
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where: 
Wt  is the nominal wage rate 
t S  is the nominal exchange rate 
*
t P  is the price of imports 
t h  is the Lagrange multiplier or marginal cost of production 
First order conditions for the optimization are: 
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After some algebra total nominal cost is found: 
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And nominal marginal cost corresponds to:       
  ( )
1
1
1 1 * 1
( ) 1 ( )
s s s s s n
t t t
t
MC S P W
A
s s s s s a a
- - -   = + -            
Real marginal cost is obtained in terms of real wage and real exchange rate, dividing the 
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The log linearized version of this expression should be included in the Phillips curve. 
Phillips curve 
The problem of the firm is to maximize expected profits:  
*
0( ) ( )
k n d
t t t k t k k E P MC y z bq
¥
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Where: 
b  is the subjective rate of time preference 
q  is the fraction of periods in the year that prices are not adjusted 
( )
d
t k Y z +  is the expected production of each firm, z, between period t and t+k 
n
t k MC +  is the expected nominal marginal cost of production between t and t+k 
Subject to the constraint that supply equals demand: 
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Demand for an individual firm’s output depends on the relative price of its output and total 
output of the economy. Firms are monopolistic competitors, facing downward sloping 
demand curves. 
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To obtain the aggregate rate of price adjustment: 
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ˆt p  is the log deviation of inflation from the steady state value 











t mc  is the log deviation of real marginal cost of production from the steady state value  
Export demand 
Demand for exports of the domestically produced composite good, 
d
t X  depends on the real 
exchange rate, Q, and foreign demand, 
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Where: 
d x r  is the degree of persistence in domestic exports 





 APPENDIX II. CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL 
1.       The model is calibrated using values taken from different studies or based on some 
international stylized facts, in particular for emerging economies (see Table 1). The 
calibrations of the financially robust and vulnerable economies are different. Given that the 
focus of the modeling is the analysis of financial vulnerability, such differences are 
concentrated in four parameters that reflect more precisely financial vulnerability.  
2.       The discount factor b  is 0.988, not far from the values found elsewhere in the 
literature (0.99), and coherent with an annual real interest rate of 4.8 percent, which is 
higher than the rate observed in the most advanced economies. The risk aversion coefficient 
σ is 1.5, within the range commonly used for this parameter in this kind of models. Labor 
supply elasticity equals 2, in line with Adolfson et al (2008). 
3.       In the advanced economy, with a well developed financial system, it is assumed that 
all consumers are able to optimize intertemporal consumption. Consequently, the proportion 
of consumption based solely on current income is assumed to be zero (i.e., λ = 0). In 
contrast, in the financially vulnerable economy, the proportion of consumption based on 
current income, λ, is assumed to be 0.3, which is close to the values considered in other 
studies (Mankiw, 2000, and Galí et al, 2007). 
4.       The other coefficients that reflect vulnerability and help in addressing the main 
objective of this article, are part of the risk premium included in the uncovered interest 
parity condition. In the robust economy, the elasticity of the country risk premium to 
foreign debt is (0.02) while in the financially vulnerable case it is 0.04. In other words, the 
vulnerable economy faces a tighter financial restriction since the risk premium reaction to 
foreign debt is larger. This coefficient supports the stability of the small open economy 
model, given that it forces the current account, as well as net foreign assets, to be stationary. 
The elasticity of the country risk premium to exports and imports are 0.10, and 0.15 
respectively. Finally, the risk premium elasticity to the real exchange rate (balance sheet 
effect) is 0.19. It is important to point out that these coefficients are zero in the robust 
economy, therefore, they are at the core of the main results. Finally, the uncovered interest 
parity condition has inertia, as in Adolfson et al (2008) and Berg et al (2006).  
5.       The price elasticity of demand for domestically produced goods is 6, yielding a 
mark up of 20 percent. Regarding price setting, 70 percent of firms in the advanced 
economy are assumed to follow forward looking price optimization, while only 40 percent 
of firms in the emerging market do so. Among the optimizing firms in both economies, it is 
assumed that firms normally adjust prices once per year, so that the fraction of firms that 
keep their prices unchanged each period is 0.75. The remaining 30 percent of firms in the 
advanced economy, and 60 percent of firms in the emerging market, that do not follow 
forward looking price optimizations, are assumed to index their prices to recent inflation. 
These shares are in line with the priors of Adolfson et al (2008) and Smets and Wouters 





6.       Since imported goods are production inputs, we assume for simplicity that the 
elasticity of substitution between labor and imported goods is unity. Furthermore, we 
choose values close to 0.25 to define the share of imports in the production function, which 
also defines the degree of openness. Indeed, it implies a ratio of imports to GDP of 0.3. This 
ratio is common among small open economies, both emerging and developed. 
7.       The elasticity of domestic exports to the real exchange rate is 5, given the strong 
competition small open economies face. In fact, it is possible to argue that domestic 
exporters face a similar elasticity to what is used in models for developed economies in the 
case of intermediate goods (Galí and Monacelli, 2005, Galí et al, 2007, Del Negro et al, 
2005).  
8.       The size of the coefficient in the monetary rule with respect to inflation, d , ranges 
from 1.05 to 2.4, and the coefficient with respect to output, j , ranges from 0.25 to 1.6. 
Finally, the weight of the exchange rate,  c , ranges from 0 to 2.25. These intervals include 
standard values for the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). In addition, these levels are considered 
feasible for central banks according to international evidence (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 
1998, 2000; Parrado, 2004). Higher coefficients could perhaps generate frontiers closer to 
the origin but are not considered to be in the feasible range.  
9.       With regard to monetary policy credibility, it is assumed that policy is highly 
credible in the advanced economy, so that there is no bias in the formation of inflation 
expectations. In the emerging economy, however, a bias is assumed. Movements in actual 
inflation are assumed to feed strongly into revisions of the perceived inflation target, 
reflected in the value of 2 for the coefficient k , and have a persistent effect reflected in the 
value of 0.8 for the persistence coefficient, p r . The feed through of the perceived inflation 
bias into expectations, however, is assumed to be limited, as reflected in the policy 
credibility coefficient of y  set at 0.1.   
10.       In steady state, the model features a foreign debt to GDP ratio of 40 percent; 
commodity production amounts to 12 percent of GDP, and imports amount to 30 percent. 
The autoregressive coefficient of demand and risk premium shocks (ρ) is 0.8; in the case of 
cost push shocks we used 0.6. 





Table 1. Parameter Calibration of the Advanced and Emerging Market Economy Models 
Parameters  Advanced economy  Emerging market 
Utility function     
Subjective discount rate: b   0.988  0.988 
Coefficient of relative risk aversion: s   1.50  1.50 
Parameter of the labor supply (disutility): v  2.00  2.00 
Habit coefficient: g   0.00  0.00 
Share of rule of thumb consumers: l   0.00  0.30 
Production function     
Factor (input) elasticity of substitution in production function:  s s   1.00  1.00 
Weight of imported factor (degree of openness): a   0.25  0.25 
Exports      
Export persistence for home goods:  d x r   0.00  0.00 
Elasticity of home exports to exchange rate: t   5.00  5.00 
Elasticity of commodity exports to exchange rate  0.00  0.00 
Price setting     
Probability of not re optimizing: q   0.75  0.75 
Degree of indexation (for firms that are not re optimizing): m   0.30  0.60 
Coefficient on expected inflation:  ( ) / 1 b bm +    0.76  0.62 
Coefficient on lagged inflation:  ( ) / 1 m bm +   0.23  0.38 
Coefficient on marginal cost::  ( ) / 1 V bm +    0.07  0.05 
Price elasticity of demand: e   6.00  6.00 
Parity condition & risk premium     
Persistence in the real exchange rate: 
s f   0.60  0.60 
Elasticity of country risk premium to foreign debt:  0 f    0.02  0.04 
Elasticity of country risk premium to exports:  1 f   0.00  0.10 
Elasticity of country risk premium to imports:  2 f   0.00  0.15 
Elasticity of risk premium to real exchange rate (balance sheet ):  3 f   0.00  0.19 
Monetary policy     
Interest rate smoothing in Taylor rule:  i r    0.70  0.70 
Exchange rate smoothing in exchange rate based inflation targeting:  q r   0.70  0.70 
Coefficient on inflation gap: d    1.05£ coeff. £2.40  1.05£ coeff. £2.40 
Coefficient on output gap: j   0.25£ coeff. £1.60  0.25£ coeff. £1.60 
Coefficient on exchange rate: c   0.00£ coeff. £2.25  0.00£ coeff. £2.25 
Monetary policy credibility     
Influence of credibility in expectations formation: y   0.00  0.10 
Persistence of target expectation:  p r   ..  0.80 
Coefficient on deviation of inflation from target: k   ..  2.00 
Shock Inertia     
Shock persistence*  Rho_R=0.80  Rho_R=0.80 
* In the case of the cost push shock, persistence is 0.6.  





APPENDIX III. SIMULATIONS 
 
12.       This appendix describes the simulation methods used to construct the policy 
frontiers, and describes the impulse responses of the models in response to different shocks. 
In addition, the appendix reports the standard deviations of macroeconomic variables under 
alternative policy rules. 
A.   Construction of Volatility Trade-off Frontiers  
Shock simulations 
 
13.       The volatility trade off frontiers shown in the main text are constructed as follows: 
·  The two types of country models were simulated with 1000 variants of each 
alternative policy reaction function. The variants of policy rules were constructed with all 
possible combinations of ten different weights on the inflation and output objectives, 
respectively, as well as on the exchange rate as shown in Table 2, below. These coefficients 
are considered feasible according to selected empirical evidence of estimated central bank 
policy reaction functions (Taylor, 1993; Clarida et al, 1998 and 2000, Parrado, 2004). The 
coefficient on the lagged instrument term was held constant. 
 
Table 2. Reaction Function Coefficients 
  Inflation 
d   
Output 
j  
Real exchange rate 
c  
1  1.05  0.25  0.00 
2  1.20  0.40  0.25 
3  1.35  0.55  0.50 
4  1.50  0.70  0.75 
5  1.65  0.85  1.00 
6  1.80  1.00  1.25 
7  1.95  1.15  1.50 
8  2.10  1.30  1.75 
9  2.25  1.45  2.00 
10  2.40  1.60  2.25 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
·  Each country model, with each variation of the parameterization of the alternative 
policy rules, is then simulated in response to each of three kinds of shocks: demand, cost 





·  Each simulation involves a 200 period run. In each period the model is subjected to 
a shock drawn from a normal distribution.
53 For each kind of shock, the 200 period 
simulation is replicated 40 times.
54  
·  These simulations provide ten time series with 200 observations, for each kind of 
shock and each policy rule variant, for each of the 29 endogenous variables. Of these, the 
variables of most interest are inflation, output, the interest rate, the exchange rate, and the 
trade balance. The standard deviation of the time series for each variable is then computed, 
between the 100
th and 120
th observation, and then averaged over each of the 40 replications, 
to come up with a standard deviation for each variable in response to each kind of shock 
and policy variant.
55 
14.       In this analysis, the perspective taken is that inflation and output smoothing are the 
ultimate objectives of monetary policy, whereas smoothing of the policy instrument or the 




15.       Once the simulations are performed, the results are organized by shocks, rules, and 
the coefficient on the exchange rate. For each of the 100 variants of coefficients on output 
and inflation in the policy rules, the averaged values of the standard deviations of inflation 
and output obtained in the shock simulations are then used to generate a scattergram of 
output and inflation volatility outcomes. The outer edges of the scattered points are then 
used to construct an “envelope” representing the minimum volatility of inflation, for any 
given level of output volatility, and vice versa, for the particular policy rule.  
16.       Figure 1 shows two scattergrams: the first for the advanced economy and the second 
for the emerging market. The scattergrams represent the possible combinations of output 
and inflation volatility when the economies are hit by demand shocks, and use a plain 
vanilla monetary policy rule. The different points correspond to different weights put on 
inflation, d , and output, j , as in Table 2. The envelopes containing these points are shown 
in the first panel of Figure 1 in the main text.  
                                                 
53 The shocks have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Thus, the shock could be interpreted as a 
one percent shock with the responses of the variables being percentage deviations from steady state (Galí, 
2003).  
54 Each simulation run uses a different initial seed for the random number generation, so that each run is 
genuinely different. The same set of seeds, however, are used for each kind of shock to ensure that differences 
in results for the different kinds of shocks are not attributable to the particular random draws.  
55 The selection of the 100
th to 120
th observations is basically to ensure that the observations in the sample are 
dominated by cross sectional rather than longitudinal variation, and also free from the influence of initial 





Figure 1. Inflation and Output Volatility With Demand Shocks and Plain Vanilla Inflation 
Targeting 












































































        Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
17.       A number of features of the two scattergrams can be noted: 
·  More forceful policy reaction functions tend to result in less volatile output and 
inflation in the case of demand shocks. For both kinds of economy, policy rules with higher 
summed weights on inflation and output tend to generate output and inflation volatility 
combinations closer to the origin. As a result, the combination closest to the origin is with a 
weight of 2.4 on inflation and 1.6 on output. 
·  In the emerging economy, under the most forceful policy combination, output and 
inflation volatility is roughly double that in the advanced economy using the same rule. This 
largely reflects differences in the efficiency of interest rate and exchange rate transmission 
in two economies. 
·  A striking result is the difference in performance of a standard Taylor rule (Taylor 
1993) in the two economies. In the advanced economy, the Taylor rule generates output and 
inflation volatility roughly double that under the most forceful rule (i.e., comparable to the 
best possible result in the emerging economy); while in the emerging economy, the Taylor 
rule generates inflation and output volatility roughly four times as great as under the most 
forceful rule. 
·  For any given degree of overall policy forcefulness, the trade offs faced by the 
advanced and emerging market differ slightly. For illustrative purposes, the figure compares 





inflation sum to 2.65.
56 In the advanced economy, it can be seen that the rule generates a 
nearly flat set of outcomes. In these circumstances, the best rule will be the one that puts 
little weight on output and most weight on inflation. In the case of the emerging economy, 
however, the outcomes, using the same rule, are convex to the origin, indicating more of a 
trade off. In this case, the rule which minimizes the variability of both output and inflation 
puts a weight of 1.6 on inflation and 0.85 on output.  
B.   Impulse Responses 
18.       The two model economies are hit with three different shocks: demand, risk 
premium, and cost push. In all cases, it is assumed that the central bank implements the 
forceful version of plain vanilla inflation targeting (i.e., with weights of 2.4 and 1.6 on 
inflation and output, respectively). In general, responses behave well in the sense that 
variables move according to economic intuition. Also, inflation and output are more volatile 
in the financially vulnerable economy than in the robust one. 
Domestic demand shocks  
 
19.       With a positive domestic demand shock, consumption, domestic GDP, and imports 
grow in the financially robust advanced economy (Figure 2). Excess demand also puts 
upward pressure on inflation. In response to the positive output gap and higher inflation, the 
central bank raises real interest rates, which also leads to real appreciation of the home 
currency. The trade balance deteriorates in response to the rise in consumption relative to 
output and the loss of competitiveness. The exchange rate plays a key role in restoring 
equilibrium, both through its effect on dampening demand pressures, and via direct pass 
through effects on traded goods prices. 
20.       In the financially vulnerable emerging economy, the demand shock also stimulates 
consumption and imports. However, there are two important differences with the advanced 
economy. First, in the emerging economy, the stimulus to consumption is greater than in the 
advanced economy (largely reflecting the higher proportion of consumption out of current 
income than in the advanced economy) and this puts greater upward pressure on inflation. 
21.       Second, in contrast with the advanced economy, the currency depreciates as the 
upward pressure on the currency from higher interest rates is more than offset by the impact 
of a rising risk premium associated with the deterioration in the trade balance and net 
foreign debt position, as well as the adverse impact of depreciation on balance sheets. As a 
result, upward pressure on interest rates is accentuated at the same time as the currency 
depreciates. The depreciation tends to accentuate the rise in inflation directly via pass 
through effects, as well as indirectly, by adding to the demand stimulus through greater 
export competitiveness. In these circumstances, monetary policy has to work harder, 
through a more sustained increase in real interest rates, to dampen demand and bring 
inflation back toward the target. In the process, the currency appreciates, reinforcing the 
                                                 






effects of higher interest rates. In contrast with the advanced economy, therefore, the initial 
response of the exchange rate to the shock is unhelpful, making the task for monetary policy 
more difficult than otherwise. 
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22.       In both the advanced and emerging economies, this type of shock leads demand and 
output to fall at the same time as inflation rises, resulting in conflicting objectives for 
monetary policy (Figure 3). Additionally, in both economies, the initial rise in inflation 
results in real appreciation of the currency, which is reinforced by an increase in real 
interest rates. However, as in the case of a demand shock, there are important differences in 
the dynamics of adjustment in the two economies. 
23.       In the advanced economy, forward looking consumption falls immediately—and by 
more than output—leading to an external trade surplus. Subsequently, monetary tightening 
to counter the rise in inflation raises real interest rates, contributing to some further 
appreciation and deterioration in the external balance. Gradually, as the adverse shock 
unwinds, output returns toward potential and inflation falls, allowing interest rates to fall. In 
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  Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
24.       In the emerging economy, consumption is less forward looking, so that initially 
output falls by more than demand, resulting in a trade deficit. In the subsequent period, 
consumption falls sharply in response to the fall in real income, so that the trade balance 
swings into surplus. The trade surplus together with the positive balance sheet effect of 
appreciation, leads in turn to a fall in the risk premium, adding to the real appreciation of 
the currency. The stronger appreciation of the currency in the emerging economy case 
contributes to the loss of competitiveness and a weakening of output and the trade balance. 
The weaker growth profile also allows interest rates to be eased more rapidly than in the 
advanced economy. 
25.       In the case of the cost push shock, the initial real appreciation of the currency helps 
to dampen the inflationary consequences of the shock, but also tends to worsen the adverse 
impact on output. Resisting appreciation of the currency would result in higher inflation, but 
it is unclear how much reduction in the volatility of output might be achieved. 
Consequently, it is not clear whether dampening the exchange rate movement would, on 
balance, improve the outcome. 
Risk premium shocks 
 
26.       An adverse risk premium shock has generally similar effects on both the advanced 





currency depreciation and a rise in inflation. The real depreciation stimulates exports, 
boosting GDP, but consumption by forward looking agents falls, leading to a trade surplus. 
27.       In both economies, monetary authorities raise interest rates to counter higher 
inflation and output growth. In the emerging economy, the improved trade balance tends to 
lower the risk premium, but this is partly offset by the negative balance sheet effect of 
depreciation. Subsequently, as the economies respond to the firming in the stance of 
monetary policy, and as the shock gradually unwinds, inflation, growth, the real exchange 
rate, and the trade balance all gradually return to steady state positions. 
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  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
28.       In both types of economy, it may be noted, if monetary policy had resisted the 
downward pressure on the currency in the first instance, this would have led to an earlier 
and sharper increase in interest rates. Although this would have accentuated the decline in 
consumption, it would have led to a smaller rise in inflation, as well as dampening the 
stimulus to net exports. Consequently, some resistance to the exchange rate could lower 
both inflation and output volatility. However, too strong a resistance to the pressure on the 
exchange rate could end up worsening performance because, beyond some point, raising 





C.   Volatility of Macroeconomic and Financial Variables Under Different Policy Rules 
29.       Tables 3a c report the standard deviations of macroeconomic and financial variables 
in the advanced, financially robust economy and the emerging, financially vulnerable 
economy, under alternative policy rules, and when exposed to different kinds of shocks. The 
standard deviations are derived from the simulations as discussed earlier. 
 
Table 3a. Performance of Alternative Policy Rules in Response to Demand Shocks 
Standard deviations of variables, in percentage points 
 












Advanced, financially robust economy 
Taylor rule  1.06  0.81  0.87  2.83  2.50  0.93  1.85 
Plain vanilla  0.51  0.52  0.93  3.76  2.88  0.51  2.34 
Open economy 
(1/2&1/2) 
0.63  0.55  0.88  2.94  2.63  0.59  1.91 
Open economy 
(XR change) 
0.50  0.56  0.89  3.43  2.77  0.53  2.16 
Open economy 
(XR level) 
0.80  0.57  0.87  2.57  2.52  0.69  1.72 
XR based IT  1.00  0.60  0.87  2.16  2.40  0.80  1.51 
Emerging, financially vulnerable economy 
Taylor rule  4.07  5.78  5.13  13.00  2.40  4.93  9.06 
Plain vanilla  0.90  1.24  1.74  2.30  2.03  1.07  2.02 
Open economy 
(1/2&1/2) 
0.88  1.09  1.69  2.12  1.93  0.99  1.91 
Open economy 
(XR change) 
0.93  1.15  1.74  2.10  1.98  1.04  1.92 
Open economy 
(XR level) 
1.10  1.06  1.65  2.28  1.88  1.08  1.97 
XR based IT  1.44  0.62  1.56  2.62  1.79  1.03  2.09 








Table 3b. Performance of Alternative Policy Rules in Response to Cost-Push Shocks 
Standard deviations of variables, in percentage points 
 












Advanced, financially robust economy 
Taylor rule  2.38  1.43  1.31  4.64  1.66  1.90  2.98 
Plain vanilla  2.42  1.50  1.25  4.16  1.12  1.96  2.70 
Open economy 
(1/2&1/2) 
2.71  1.28  1.25  3.27  0.92  2.00  2.26 
Open economy 
(XR change) 
2.47  1.38  1.24  3.77  1.11  1.92  2.51 
Open economy 
(XR level) 
2.92  1.79  1.32  5.20  1.34  2.36  3.26 
XR based IT  2.38  1.43  1.31  4.64  1.66  1.90  2.98 
Emerging, financially vulnerable economy 
Taylor rule  2.46  4.89  3.34  12.90  1.40  3.68  8.12 
Plain vanilla  2.87  3.03  1.27  7.65  0.87  2.95  4.46 
Open economy 
(1/2&1/2) 
3.91  2.65  1.33  6.45  1.03  3.28  3.89 
Open economy 
(XR change) 
3.12  2.70  1.44  6.95  0.99  2.91  4.20 
Open economy 
(XR level) 
4.84  2.65  1.35  6.18  1.19  3.74  3.76 
XR based IT  5.09  2.58  0.97  5.99  1.10  3.84  3.48 







Table 3c. Performance of Alternative Policy Rules in Response to Risk Premium Shocks 
Standard deviations of variables, in percentage points 
 












Advanced, financially robust economy 
Taylor rule  0.70  0.99  0.93  6.81  3.45  0.84  3.87 
Plain vanilla  0.26  0.54  0.88  4.91  2.81  0.40  2.90 
Open economy 
(1/2&1/2) 
0.29  0.25  0.89  3.67  2.42  0.27  2.28 
Open economy 
(XR change) 
0.36  0.42  0.87  4.33  2.62  0.39  2.60 
Open economy 
(XR level) 
0.42  0.14  0.91  3.18  2.26  0.28  2.05 
XR based IT  0.66  0.44  1.26  1.44  1.76  0.55  1.35 
Emerging, financially vulnerable economy 
Taylor rule  2.25  2.99  3.00  9.05  1.78  2.62  6.03 
Plain vanilla  0.44  0.56  1.04  3.23  1.53  0.50  2.13 
Open economy 
(1/2&1/2) 
0.33  0.29  0.81  2.47  1.45  0.31  1.64 
Open economy 
(XR change) 
0.50  0.38  0.92  2.84  1.58  0.44  1.88 
Open economy 
(XR level) 
0.52  0.26  0.75  2.24  1.35  0.39  1.49 
XR based IT  0.71  0.38  0.60  1.33  1.27  0.54  0.97 
   Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 